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Keynote speakers > Salvador Barberà
As a researcher Prof. Barberà has concentrated in the fields of public economics, incentives, utility and game theory. More specifically, he is an expert in social choice theory, the design of strategy-proof mechanisms, and the analysis of voting procedures. He has co-edited a two-volume Handbook of Utility Theory, and his publications have appeared in Econometrica, American Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies, The Journal of Political Economy, The Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior and Social Choice and Welfare, among others. Responsibilities: his current or past editorial responsibilities include The Spanish Economic Review, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Social Choice and Welfare, Mathematical Social Sciences and The Journal of Public Economic Theory. He served as General Secretary of Research and Technological Policies in the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (2004-2006). Prior to that, between 2000 and 2004, he was the first director of the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), a foundation created by the Catalan Government in order to consolidate in Catalonia a group of high level scientists of all origins. He has also served as the Vice-Chairman of the Barcelona GSE and Scientific Director of the School's Master in the Economics of Science and Innovation (2007-2012). Noticeable distinctions: he is past-president of the Social Choice and Welfare Society and of the Southern European Economic Association (ASSET). He has been elected to the Council of different learned societies, including the Econometric Society, The Social Choice and Welfare Society and The Society for the Advancement of Game Theory. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Rey Juan Carlos Award in Economics, the Spanish National Research Prize, and the Narcís Monturiol Medal, awarded by Generalitat de Catalunya. He has also been named Doctorate Honoris Causa at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide. I will review some of the main issues that arise when trying to design mechanisms under which revealing their true characteristics is a dominant strategy for all agents involved. I will start by formulating some early fundamental results in the theory of voting, and will then discuss how they can be extended to more general frameworks. The connections between individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness and efficiency will be discussed. I will emphasize that the possibility of designing satisfactory mechanisms crucially depends on the characteristics of their domains of definition, which reflect the kind and extent of environments on which these mechanisms are expected to operate.
Webpage: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/ |
Salvador Barberà is Emeritius Professor of Economics at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Emeritus Research Professor at the Barcelona GSE. He earned a PhD in Economics from Northwestern University (1975).| Online user: 1 |
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