How Political Parties Shape Electoral Competition

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Job Market Paper

This version: 27 Dec 2014
Latest draft: www.nmotz.com/NMpartyf.pdf

Abstract

This paper provides a model of party formation that can explain political monopolies, where one party consistently wins elections with a large share of votes. I use data on election results from a sample of federal countries to demonstrate that monopolies are observable at the state rather than the federal level, and that these monopolies are typically held by national parties with a relatively broad ideological appeal. This raises the question of why there is no entry of regional parties better able to cater to the political preferences of voters in particular states. In the model, the answer lies in the career concerns of politicians: State politicians would like to advance their career to the federal level, but only have the opportunity of doing so as a member of a federally successful party. If politicians value such career opportunities sufficiently strongly, entry of regional parties does not occur. There then exists an equilibrium with two parties, one centre-left and one centre-right, where each party dominates some states. Beyond explaining the existence of regional monopolies, the model is also able to reproduce broader patterns in the data on election results and makes empirical predictions regarding the sorting of politicians into parties across different regions.

Keywords: Political parties, electoral competition.

JEL Classification: D72.

*I am grateful to my supervisors Ian Preston and Guy Laroque for their support. Omer Ali was immensely helpful in providing feedback as well as some of the data used in this paper. I would also like to thank Antonio Cabrales, Anders Jensen, Aureo de Paula, and Lukas Wenner for helpful comments and discussions.
1 Introduction

Across federal democracies a common pattern can be observed. At the federal level, elections are competitive: Multiple parties participate and more than one of them stands a chance of emerging as the winner. Accordingly, a single party rarely manages to hold on to power for more than two or three electoral cycles. In contrast, it is not uncommon to observe that elections in a particular state are dominated by one party. In the United States, it is well known that many states in the south have become strongholds of the Republican Party. In the German state of Bremen, the Social Democratic Party has been in control of the state legislature for more than 60 years. Similarly, the Austrian People’s Party has ruled the states of Tyrol and Vorarlberg ever since the end of the Second World War.

To demonstrate this pattern more systematically, I collect election results for a number of federal countries. My sample consists of Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, and the US. Using this data, I construct a measure of how competitive elections in a particular region are, as described in detail in section 2.

The results are presented in figure 1, which clearly shows that federal elections are typically about as competitive as the most competitive states in the respective country, while in each country there are states where competition is substantially lower than at the federal level. Particularly puzzling is the existence of states that are practically monopolized by one party. This is generally the case when my measure of competitiveness takes values of about 20 or higher. The examples mentioned above all fall into this category. The reason why the existence of such regional monopolies is puzzling is that they are typically held by national parties with a relatively broad ideological profile. Why is there no entry of regional parties better able to cater to the views of voters in such states? And if something allows parties to dominate a region, why is this force not at play at the national level as well? Providing a satisfactory answer to these questions requires a concept of what exactly the role of political parties is.

In the model that I construct in this paper—and in line with a growing body of empirical research to be discussed below—the policy choices of a politician are largely determined by this politician’s preferences. Voters therefore care about

\footnote{A more in-depth discussion of the figure is provided in section 2, where I also address alternative explanations of the patterns in the data.}
Notes: Each circle represents elections in a given state, while crosses stand for federal-level elections. A higher number implies a lower degree of competition.

the preferences of politicians, but are initially poorly informed about these. Following Snyder & Ting (2002), parties provide some of this information by not allowing politicians of all political shades to join. Seeing that a politician is a member of a particular party thus tells voters that this politician must fall into a specific region of the political spectrum. In contrast, there would be no role for parties in the model if voters were fully informed.

In order to compete, parties thus need to attract the right kind of politicians. Importantly, politicians also care about their chances of getting elected. This concern is a main driver of the choice of party affiliation. A key insight that emerges from the model is that political parties that are successful in national elections can maintain regional monopolies because they offer career prospects at the federal level. As an example, consider a state like Nebraska where the Republican Party currently controls all major elected offices. Suppose strongly conservative members of the Republican Party in Nebraska could form a separate party and do equally well in state elections. This would have the benefit of
eliminating internal competition for nominations from politicians belonging to the more moderate wing of the party. It would, however, also deprive members of the newly formed party of any chance of advancing to the federal level. If these career prospects are valuable enough, conservative politicians in Nebraska prefer to remain a part of the Republican Party, which can then maintain its hold on the state.

While the moderate wing of the Republican Party is a burden to conservatives in a right-leaning state, the conservative wing is a detriment to the electoral chances of the party at the national level. It makes the party more extreme and thus less attractive to voters in the political centre. The national party itself might therefore have an incentive to try to exclude its most conservative members. But this would result in the establishment of a more extreme party and the risk of a split in the conservative vote. This threat of entry is the force that prevents the national party from moderating itself in the model and may explain why the establishment of the Republican Party has been relatively accommodating towards the radical Tea Party movement.

The main result of the paper is that there exists an equilibrium where two parties are formed, one centre-left and one centre-right. Both parties win with equal probability at the federal level while dominating some state elections. This equilibrium is maintained by the forces described above: Neither party can shift further towards the centre without inducing entry of a third party, while in equilibrium such entry is precluded as politicians have no incentive to deviate towards joining a new party.

State monopolies exist in this equilibrium because parties have strongly differentiated ideological profiles. This enables each party to capture a large share of votes in particular states. For example, in a state with a median voter located far to the left, the centre-left party dominates state elections, while states with a more moderate median voter will be more competitive. The model is thus able to recreate the pattern displayed in figure 1. As I will argue in section 2, other factors may be at play as well, but cannot convincingly explain the data by themselves.

To the best of my knowledge, the contrasting patterns of political competition at the state and at the federal level have previously not been demonstrated as clearly as in figure 1. Besley et al. (2010) discuss the wide variation in the degree of competition observable across US states, but do not refer to the federal level. Their empirical results are nevertheless closely related to the current paper, in that they show that in states where competition is lower policies tend
to be less favourable to growth and actual growth is reduced as well. This indicates that the dominance of one party has negative consequences and highlights the need for a better understanding of how such political monopolies emerge.

A related theoretical paper is provided by Callander (2005), who studies competition between two parties in multiple single-member districts with threat of entry at the district level. Parties, which are not explicitly modelled, are free to choose any platform. Callander finds that the threat of entry leads to the divergence of party platforms, similar to this paper. The mechanism through which entry is deterred is different though. In addition, the equilibrium presented by Callander requires specific assumptions on the distribution of voters across districts, while the restrictions imposed on voter distributions in this paper are mild. This is because entry in the model of Callander implies the loss of one district, while entry has much wider consequences in the current model as explained above. Previous contributions to the literature on political competition with entry consider only a single district (Palfrey 1984, Osborne 1993, 2000).

Political parties clearly form a central element of the political system of democratic countries, yet they have received surprisingly little attention, at least in terms of formal modelling. Few papers have attempted to fully endogenize the number parties existing in equilibrium as I do here (Jackson & Moselle 2002, Levy 2004, Morelli 2004, Osborne & Tourky 2008, Eguia 2011). As mentioned above, the concept of political parties that I employ is taken from Snyder & Ting (2002). These authors, as well as other contributions building on their approach (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2008, Bernhardt et al. 2009), consider the behaviour of a given number of parties. I show how the concept of parties as “informative labels” can yield an equilibrium with two parties that looks very similar to what we observe in a number of countries. Furthermore, I demonstrate that career concerns of politicians can be a driving force behind the number and shapes of parties that form in equilibrium. Previously, attention has mainly focused on variations in the electoral system as a determinant of the number of parties (see Morelli 2004). Overall, I feel that the success of the model presented here in reproducing and explaining empirical regularities indicates that thinking of parties as informative labels is a fruitful approach.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 details the construction of the measure of political competitiveness I use and addresses some alternative explanations of the pattern displayed in figure 1. In section 3 I discuss a number of empirical results that lend support to some of the assumptions
made in the model, which is laid out in section 4. Section 5 gives the theoretical results. Robustness of the results to relaxing some of the assumptions made in the basic version of the model is discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 Measuring Competitiveness

I want to illustrate how political competitiveness varies across regions. In selecting countries to include in my sample I focus on federal states for three main reasons: First of all, the result of Besley et al. (2010) that limitations on political competition are harmful was established at the state level for the US. Secondly, federal states have stable regional boundaries that are less subject to manipulation by politicians than is the case for other kinds of administrative units. This rules out gerrymandering as an explanation of regional monopolies. Finally, state elections carry some weight, making it harder to argue that the formation of parties is entirely driven by considerations regarding the national level.

My sample consists of state and federal elections for the countries Austria, Australia, Canada, Germany and the US.\footnote{Election results were retrieved from the following sources:
Austria and Germany: www.parties-and-elections.eu/
Australia: elections.uwa.edu.au/
Canada: www.electionalmanac.com
US presidential elections: www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/common/pop_vote.html
US gubernatorial elections after 1990: library.cqpress.com/elections/ .} I focus on elections that directly or indirectly determine the selection of federal or state executives. Accordingly, the elections I consider are for state and federal parliaments. The only exception is given by the US, where I compare popular voter shares for presidential elections with results of gubernatorial elections. My data generally includes all such elections between 1945 and June 2014. For the US I restrict the sample to elections held after the passage of the voting rights act of August 1965. Prior to this event the Democratic Party dominated the US South, partially through limiting the ability of African-Americans to vote. In Germany I include only the 11 states belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany prior to 1990.

My measure of the competitiveness of an election is the vote margin between the highest and the second-highest vote getter. Denote this vote margin for an election at time $t$ in administrative unit $r$ by $d_r^t$, where $r$ stands either for a particular state or the federal level of a country. I then measure the
competitiveness of elections in region $r$ by computing average vote margins over time:

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t} d_{r}^t,$$

where $T$ is the total number of elections in region $r$ included in the sample. These are the values displayed in figure 1.\(^3\)

Austria, Germany, and the US show the same pattern of highly contested federal elections and wide vote margins in at least some states. The picture for Australia is similar, but less extreme. In fact, no Australian state is dominated by one of the two main parties of the country.\(^4\) It would seem that this is a consequence of relatively homogeneous distributions of voters across states. In Canada, on the other hand, competition at the federal level is relatively low. This reflects the success of the Liberal Party in the nineteenth century, but also the landslide victories of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1958 and 1984. The more important difference between Canada and the other countries, however, is not visible in the picture: Canadian federal parties are only loosely connected to state parties and successful regional parties that play no role at the federal level exist. Such regional parties can be observed mostly in countries with strong regional identities such as Canada, Belgium, or Spain. Their presence highlights the question of why such parties fail to exist in other countries. I will return to this issue at the end of section 5.2.

Of course, my model is not able to explain why voter preferences are distributed in a certain way, but takes this as a given input. However, the model suggests that voter preferences may play a surprisingly small role in determining the number and shapes of parties. The assumptions on voter heterogeneity I impose below are mild. Once this minimal amount of heterogeneity is given, further increases in heterogeneity do not induce existing parties to change their positions nor do they lead to the entry of additional parties. A different issue would be to allow for the possibility that voters develop preferences for particular parties rather than just over policies. This could allow parties to consolidate their position in a region over time. Apart from the tautology inherent in saying that a party wins because voters want it to win, this would also leave the

\(^3\)The measure of competitiveness employed by Besley et al. (2010) is the absolute value of the distance of the Democratic vote share from one-half. This number is a linear function of the measure employed here in races where no more than two parties participate, but clearly less appropriate in other settings.

\(^4\)I treat the coalition of the Liberal Party and the National Party as a single party. Keeping them separate makes Australian elections look somewhat less competitive.
question unanswered of what drives party formation in the first place.

To conclude this section, I will briefly discuss two other factors beyond heterogeneity in voter preferences that may play a role in shaping the outcomes shown in figure 1. The first one is the role of incumbents running for re-election. It is well known that, at least in the US, incumbents tend to enjoy an electoral advantage. Some states in the US also have less strict term limits for governors. This raises the question to what extent the difference between federal and state elections is a consequence of the presence of incumbents at either level. I demonstrate for the US that this factor is of minor importance. To do so, I run a regression of presidential and gubernatorial vote margins in my sample on a set of state dummies as well as an indicator for the presence of an incumbent. The coefficient on the incumbent dummy indeed turns out to be highly significant with a magnitude of slightly more than five percent. The effect on the remaining coefficients is small, as can be seen in figure 2. The first column in this graph reproduces the raw average vote margins for the US as shown before. The second column plots predicted vote margins with the incumbent dummy set to zero. The presence of incumbents does not appear to be a main driver of the low competitiveness of many gubernatorial elections.

A second concern I want to address is that differences in the rate of turnout between state and federal elections might be of importance. Lower turnout could potentially make election results more volatile and thus result in higher average vote margins. This would not explain the persistently high vote margins in favour of one party though, as they are observable across a range of states in different countries. It is harder to rule out that differential rates of turnout among different groups of voters could result in larger vote margins. However, the results of (Levine & Palfrey 2007) point in the opposite direction: In an experiment on voter turnout, these authors find that those favouring a disadvantaged candidate are more likely to vote. In addition, turnout is lower in the experiment when the expected closeness of the election is reduced. This suggests that low turnout in state elections might be a consequence rather than a cause of high vote margins.

3 Related Empirical Evidence

This section will discuss empirical evidence supportive of some of the assumptions featured in the model or the general ideas behind it. First of all, a growing
literature investigates the determinants of the policy choices of elected officials. Chattoppadhyay & Duflo (2004) and Bhalotra & Clots-Figueras (2014) find that policy preferences of politicians matter. Both papers establish that an exogenous increase in female representation in India leads to a greater provision of public services typically utilised by women. The results of Lee et al. (2004) go further: According to their estimates the voting behaviour of individual members of the US House of Representatives is independent of their electoral odds. This seems to indicate that the preferences of politicians not only influence but largely determine policy choices. Otherwise one would expect legislators in close election to alter their voting behaviour in an attempt to cater to voter tastes. Similar results are obtained by Levitt (1996) for the US Senate, who additionally controls for a potential role of party discipline imposed on legislators.

A second strand of evidence relates to the nature of political parties. Casual observation suggests that in many countries the vast majority of votes is cast for two parties, one located left and one located right of the political centre, which
tend to alternate in power. In view of the studies cited above, the interpretation of the statement that a party is centre-left would have to be that the politicians belonging to such a party prefer centre-left policies, at least on average. This is also formally confirmed by research estimating the ideological positions of politicians. Poole & Rosenthal (1997, 2001) do so using voting records from the US Congress. According to their results the membership of both the Republican and the Democratic Party spans a wide range of positions, but with very little overlap between them. Barberá (forthcoming) finds very similar results using data from the social network Twitter. He also applies his method to five European countries, and again a similar picture emerges.  

All of this is consistent with the view of parties as collections of similar-minded politicians. In this case voters can learn something about a politician’s views from observing which party she is a member of, even if they cannot observe preferences of politicians directly. This is the idea formalised by Snyder & Ting (2002) and applied in this paper. Snyder & Ting also demonstrate empirically that voters’ knowledge of an individual politician’s position is almost entirely captured by her party affiliation. They use estimates of these positions to predict how voters place candidates on an ideological scale. As it turns out, a simple dummy for party affiliation does just as well in explaining the variation in voter knowledge.

Finally, career concerns of politicians are a driving force behind the results. In the context of the model, it seems natural to assume that politicians progress from the regional to the national level. After all, winning a regional election reveals information about a politician, which is a strong advantage when facing a competitor who is unknown to voters. At least for the US, it is well documented that politicians indeed use elections as stepping stones towards higher offices. For example, Diermeier et al. (2005) collect a sample of members of the US Congress in the period 1947 to 1994. They find that 78 percent of these politicians held a different local, state, or federal elected office before joining Congress. About ten percent of representatives in their sample run for a Senate seat. Of those who leave Congress, 35 percent stay in politics. In Germany, candidates for the office of federal prime minister as well as federal ministers are frequently recruited from among state prime ministers (p. 193).

As the author remarks, the reason that he finds somewhat more overlap between parties in Europe may be due to the possibility that variation in political preferences is less well captured by a single dimension.
4 The Model

A federal state consisting of $S \geq 4$ states selects federal and state governments through plurality rule elections. Candidates for these elections are nominated by political parties. I divide the game into two main stages: A party formation stage and an election stage. Each stage will be described in more detail below once some of the basic elements of the game have been introduced. Note that the model features no “states of nature” and the word state therefore always refers to a geographical unit.

4.1 Voters, Politicians, and Parties

Each state $s$ has an infinite set of citizens and each citizen votes in two elections: The election for the government of state $s$ and the election for the federal government. Let $p_s$ and $p_f$ denote the policies that are implemented in state $s$ and at the federal level, respectively. The objective of voters in election $l \in \{s, f\}$ is to maximize

$$E[u(|p_l - i|)] ,$$

where $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a decreasing function while $i \in \mathbb{R}$ is the ideal policy of the voter. As will become clear later, the outcomes of state elections may affect events at the federal level, but it is assumed that voters do not take this interdependence into account when voting at the state level. This is done simply to make the proofs presented in subsequent sections more compact, but is otherwise not necessary.\footnote{If voters were forward-looking, this would only change their behaviour where voting for their less preferred candidate at the state level would somehow yield a sufficiently large benefit at the federal level. In all of the specific situations dealt with below it can be shown that this is impossible.}

Each state also has a finite set of politicians. As discussed in section 3, preferences over policies appear to be the main driver of the choices that politicians make in office. In the basic version of the model, I assume that these preferences are sufficiently strong to make any politician always implement her ideal policy. Every politician is thus associated with a policy that she has to implement if elected to any state or federal office. In order to avoid confusion with preference parameters of voters I refer to the policy of a politician as her platform. I will allow politicians to be more flexible in their policy choices in section 6. An additional simplification that is required for tractability is that politicians have only three possible platform, namely -1, 0, and 1. The number of cases
to consider increases rapidly in the number of possible platforms and is already large with three platforms. A possible interpretation of this assumption is that voters have a coarse perception of the policies chosen by politicians. Evidence from psychology indicates that people tend to think in simplifying categories (For a discussion of some of this research see Fryer & Jackson 2008). Each state has three politicians and none of them share the same platform. Put differently, there is one politician located at each of the possible policies -1, 0, and 1. I will apply the labels centrist, extremist, rightist, and leftist to politicians in the obvious manner.

For an election at level \( l \in \{s, f\} \) the winning candidate receives a payoff of \( y_l > 0 \). A politician who has won a state election but does not win the nomination of her party for the federal election nevertheless receives a payoff of \( y_P > 0 \) if her party wins the federal election. This payoff has a number of interpretations. It may represent opportunities to move upwards in the party hierarchy that arise when a party wins the federal election or the chance of becoming a member of the federal government. A second interpretation of this payoff is that career opportunities in the private sector become more valuable if a politician is well connected within the party in power. It is also possible to think of \( y_P \) as representing “pork”: The leader of a state government will be likely to receive more federal money if her party is in control of the federal government.

In order to clearly define the utility of a politician, let \( \pi_s \) be the probability that a politician is nominated for and wins the state election in her state. Conditional on doing so, let \( \pi_n \) give the probability that a politician is nominated for the federal election. \( \pi_f \) is then the likelihood of winning conditional on receiving the nomination, while \( \pi_P \) is the probability that the party wins conditional on some other candidate having received the nomination. All of these probabilities will later be determined in equilibrium. The expected utility of a politician who has joined a party is given by

\[
\pi_s (y_s + \pi_n \pi_f y_f + (1 - \pi_n) \pi_P y_P),
\]

while a politician who is not part of a party receives a payoff of zero. It is assumed that \( y_f > 2y_P \).

A political party is basically a subset of the policy space and only politicians whose platforms fall within this subset can join. This idea is based on Snyder & Ting (2002), where the leadership of a party chooses a platform and politi-
cians pay a cost for joining the party that depends on the distance between this platform and their own ideal policy. Two interpretations of this cost are given: First, politicians could find it costly to be members of an organisation that pursues goals that differ from their personal views. Second, parties could be actively screening their members and only promote those who agree with the party line. As a result, only politicians with an ideal policy belonging to an interval centred around the party platform join. The size of the interval depends on the membership cost in the first interpretation, or the effectiveness of screening in the second interpretation. I simplify things by giving parties full control over the size of the interval that represents the party. Given that the space of platforms consists of integers, parties will be given by “integer intervals”: For \( a, b \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \) define

\[
[a..b] \equiv \{ p \in \{-1, 0, 1\} : a \leq p \leq b \}.
\]

If \( a \) equals \( b \) I simply write \([a]\). The set of all possible shapes a particular party can have is

\[
I = \{ [-1], [0], [1], [-1..0], [0..1] \}.
\]

Note that parties that allow all types of politicians to join are not allowed for. Including them would give rise to two additional equilibria, which have some implausible features and can easily be eliminated with an additional refinement. In order to not distract from the main arguments, I exclude this type of party for now. Section 6 will discuss the consequences of also admitting parties of shape \([-1..1]\) in more detail.

Parties are organized nationally, meaning that the interval that represents the party is the same in all states. The set of politicians that joins a party does not have to be the same across states, however, as politicians in different states might face different incentives. Individual parties will be denoted by capital letters. For any such party \( P \) the shape of the party is given by \( I_P \in I \). Multiple parties are allowed to have the same shape.

4.2 The Election Stage

In order to describe the election stage, let there be \( N \) existing parties, collected in the set \( P \). Let \( P(p) \) denote the possibly empty set of existing parties that include the policy \( p \). The strategy set of a politician with platform \( p \) in this subgame is then given by \( P(p) \). Note that this means that a politician can join
at most one party and that a politician who has the ability to join at least one party must do so. The latter assumption is made for convenience and could easily be replaced with a small payoff that a politician receives once she joins a party.

The election stage starts with politicians making their affiliation decisions, followed by simultaneous state elections, which in turn are followed by the federal election. Immediately prior to each election every party nominates a candidate, who is drawn uniformly at random from the candidate pool of the party for the election in question. For a particular state the candidate pool of a party consists of all politicians of that state who have joined this party. Each winner of a state election then becomes a member of the candidate pool of their party for the federal election. Of course, candidate selection is generally an important strategic decision. As it turns out, however, parties have an incentive to commit to a candidate selection mechanism that gives extremists a sufficiently high chance of being nominated. I explain this in more detail in section 6.

The policy that is implemented in a state is equal to the platform of the politician elected in the state election, just like the policy at the federal level is equal to the platform of the politician elected in the federal election. The winner of each election is the candidate that achieves the highest number of votes with ties resolved randomly.

4.3 The Party-Formation Stage

Parties are formed by “founders”. Founders can choose to propose a party or remain passive and are divided into two groups, both of which have a countably infinite number of members. The first group consists of early movers. The action space of these founders is given by $I \cup \emptyset$, where $\emptyset$ stands for the decision not to propose a party. Once a founder has proposed a party, I will also refer to this founder as a party leader. Each member of the second group of founders, so called late movers, randomly draws a shape $I$ from a distribution with full support on the set $I$. The action space of such a founder is then given by $\{I, \emptyset\}$.

The party formation stage then proceeds as follows: Initially, all early movers simultaneously decide to propose a party or to stay passive. I will refer to all parties formed at this stage as incumbent parties. Subsequently, all late movers simultaneously choose whether they want to field a party. I will refer to all such parties as entrant parties. This timing has the effect that founders who move first have to take into account that their actions may induce entry of additional
parties, similar to a standard model of entry with competing firms. Reducing the flexibility of late movers in the shape of party that they can offer is necessary, as the complexity of determining equilibria of subgame otherwise makes the model intractable.

Each founder pays a cost $c > 0$ for proposing a party, while she receives a payoff of $x_w > 0$ for every state election that her party wins, as well as a payoff of $x_f > 0$ if her party wins the federal election. Denoting by $\rho_r$ with $r \in \{1, \ldots, S, f\}$ the equilibrium probability that the party of a founder wins election $r$, the expected utility of a founder who proposes a party is given by

$$\sum_{s=1}^{S} \rho_s x_w + \rho_f x_f - c.$$ 

Passive founders always achieve a utility of zero. I assume $c < x_w$, so that a founder whose party wins at least one state election does not want to deviate to remaining passive.

4.4 Information

A crucial feature of the concept of political parties employed here is that voters have limited information about politicians. At the beginning of the game, the electorate cannot distinguish between different politicians, but knows how their platforms are distributed. In contrast, politicians and founders observe platforms. Everything apart from platforms is common knowledge. In particular, voters know which parties have been proposed and how many politicians have joined each one of them in each state. Knowing that a candidate belongs to a certain party therefore allows voters to update their beliefs about this politician’s platform prior to casting their vote for the state-level election. The winner of the election then implements her platform at the state level, thus revealing it to voters. Voters accordingly have full information about candidates at the federal level. All agents are also fully informed about the distribution of voters in all states and at the federal level.

4.5 Equilibrium

The timing of the game is summarised in figure 3. Any set of parties $\mathcal{P}$ that gets proposed in the first two stages of the model leads to a proper subgame comprised of the steps previously referred to as the election stage. I will refer
Founders propose parties
Previously passive founders propose parties
Politicians choose affiliations
State elections
Federal election
Election Subgame
Entry Subgame

Figure 3: Timing

to this as the election subgame under the set of parties $\mathcal{P}$. Similarly, any set of incumbent parties $\mathcal{J}$ proposed at the first stage of the game leads to proper subgame starting with the possible formation of entrant parties. I will refer to this as the entry subgame under the set of parties $\mathcal{J}$.

Given that the game features incomplete information, the appropriate equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By itself, this would entail the possibility of a huge number of equilibria that exist when voters are allowed to vote strategically. Other papers in the literature on party formation assume sincere voting to avoid this problem. I generally allow for strategic voting, but impose three plausible restrictions: First of all, I consider only equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. The exclusion of weakly dominated strategies is a common way of refining voting equilibria and excludes the possibility that voters vote for their least preferred candidate. The second restriction reads as follows: If a candidate is the unique most preferred option of a strict majority of voters, then this candidate wins the election. In general, there may exist voting equilibria where a different candidate gets elected in this situation, but it nevertheless seems likely that voters will be able to solve the coordination problem in this case. The third restriction is akin to a tie breaking rule: I assume that all candidates receive an equal number of votes if all voters are indifferent between all candidates, but only if the election takes place along the equilibrium path. Imposing this restriction along the equilibrium path only can be interpreted as “party loyalty”: If an additional party enters, indifferent voters may continue
to vote for one of the previously existing parties out of habit.

The following definition summarises the equilibrium concept:

**Definition 1.** A party-formation equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the party-formation game that satisfies the following conditions:

i) No player uses a weakly dominated strategy.

ii) If a candidate in some election is the unique most preferred option of a strict majority of voters, then this candidate wins the election.

iii) Along the equilibrium path all candidates receive an equal share of votes if all voters are indifferent between all candidates.

I will restrict attention to equilibria in which only incumbent parties form along the equilibrium path. This is without loss of generality regarding the shapes and numbers of parties that can be supported in equilibrium. I will use stars to denote equilibrium objects. In particular, \( P^* \) will denote the set of parties formed in equilibrium, while \( N^* \equiv |P^*| \). In addition, \( w^*_P \) will denote the equilibrium number of state elections won by party \( P \).

### 4.6 Voter Distributions

A crucial input of the model is the set of voters. I will only make relatively weak assumptions in this regard. More specifically, the results in subsequent sections require a minimum amount of heterogeneity in voter tastes. Figure 1 seems to indicate that actual heterogeneity is often substantial.

Before stating my assumptions, I need to take a step towards analysing behaviour in the model. Suppose there are two parties, \( A \) and \( B \), contesting a state election. Party \( A \) has the politician with platform -1 as the unique member, while the remaining two politicians have joined party \( B \). Assume voters are aware of this. Each voter then knows that the candidate nominated by party \( A \) has platform -1. The candidate of party \( B \), on the other hand, is equally likely to have either platform 0 or 1 due to the assumption of random candidate selection. Let \( p^- \) be the unique real number such that a voter with ideal policy equal to \( p^- \) is indifferent between the candidate of either party, that is \( p^- \) solves

\[
u(|1 - p^-|) = \frac{1}{2} [u(|1 - p^-|) + u(|1 - p^-|)].
\]
As the utility of voters is symmetric around their ideal policy and \( u \) was assumed to be decreasing, it must be the case that \( p^- \in (-0.5, 0) \).\(^7\) Next, consider the situation that would result if the politician with platform 0 were to switch from party B to party A. In this case a voter with ideal policy \(|p^-|\) would be indifferent between voting for either party. Denote this policy by \( p^+ \).

I assume that the set of voters in any state \( s \) can be described by a measure \( V_s \) over possible ideal policies. Let \( m_s \) denote the median associated with this measure. Similarly, let \( V_f \) be the measure of voters at the federal election with median \( m_f \). It is assumed that \( m_f \) is equal to zero. It will often be important to know what share of voters in some region \( r \in 1, \ldots, S, f \) is located in the interval \([-0.5, 0.5]\). I will therefore define

\[
\Lambda_r([-0.5, 0.5]) = \frac{V_r([-0.5, 0.5])}{V_r[\mathbb{R}]}. 
\]

The first more substantial assumption regarding voter preferences specifies that there is some minimum amount of heterogeneity in voter distributions across states: Let there be at least one state \( s \) such that \( m_s < -0.5 \), at least one state \( s' \) such that \( m_{s'} \in (p^-, p^+) \) and \( \Lambda_{s'}([-0.5, 0.5]) > 0.5 \), and at least one state \( s'' \) such that \( m_{s''} > 0.5 \). Note that -0.5 (0.5) is the ideal policy at which a voter is indifferent between the platforms -1 and 0 (0 and 1). I will refer to states with median voter below -0.5 or above 0.5 as extremist states, while states with median voter between \( p^- \) and \( p^+ \) are called centrist states. Purely for convenience, I will also assume that there is no state with median voter located at \( p^- \) or \( p^+ \).

The second assumption on voter distributions says that voters at the federal level are not too concentrated in the centre of the policy space: \( \Lambda_f([-0.5, 0.5]) \leq 0.5 \). This requirement would be satisfied, for example, if \( V_f \) was the probability measure associated with a uniform distribution with support on an interval of length at least equal to two, or a normal distribution with variance slightly above one-half.

\(^7\)These assumptions imply that a voter with ideal policy equal to -0.5 is indifferent between the policies -1 and 0, but strictly prefers -1 over 1. She must therefore strictly prefer the candidate of party A over the candidate of party B. A voter with ideal policy zero, on the other hand, is indifferent between the policies -1 and 1 and therefore strictly prefers party B over party A due to the possibility that party B nominates a centrist candidate.
5 Results

The model described in the previous section has many equilibria. This should come as no surprise: After all, it features two coordination problems—one between politicians and one between voters—as well as unrestricted out-of-equilibrium beliefs that can be freely chosen to support a specific equilibrium. In particular, voters may believe that a politician who deviates has a platform that the median voter of the state dislikes, which makes it unlikely that the deviation is successful.\(^8\)

Given the multiplicity of equilibria, I will proceed as follows: Given their empirical relevance, my main interest is in equilibria with two parties. It turns out that this class can be fully characterized, as I discuss in the next section. This section contains the main results of the paper. In general, however, the number of equilibria is large. 5.2 will discuss this in more detail and suggest a refinement.

5.1 Equilibria with Two Parties

Following the discussion in section 3, a natural starting point is a situation with a centre-left and a centre-right party. The most obvious formalisation of this would be an equilibrium where the set of proposed parties is equal to \(\{L, R\}\) with \(I_L = [-1..0]\) and \(I_R = [0..1]\).

Given that parties \(L\) and \(R\) are the only existing parties, how will politicians behave? Those with platform -1 and 1 will become members of the unique party available to them by assumption. In a state with median voter below \(p^-\) it then does not matter which party the politician with platform 0 joins: The median voter always prefers party \(L\).\(^9\) As this is her only chance of getting elected, politician 0 will therefore always join party \(L\) in such states. Analogously, a politician with platform 0 will join party \(R\) in a state where the ideal policy of the median voter is greater than \(p^+\).

In centrist states, in contrast, politician 0 can make either party the winner of the state election by joining. The probability with which politician 0 is nomi-

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\(^8\)Such beliefs are not entirely unrestricted though. Consider for example the case where all politicians in some state have joined a party that allows any politician to join. If one politician deviates and joins a party with shape \([-1..0]\), voters find themselves at an information set that has two nodes; one for the case in which politician -1 has deviated and one for the case in which politician 0 has deviated. Voters may assign arbitrary weights to either node. Naturally, they may not attach any weight to the possibility that politician 1 has deviated.

\(^9\)Note that voters always know who has joined which party in this setting as there are no information sets that contain more than one node.
nated for and wins the state election in such states is thus the same independent
of which party politician 0 becomes a member of. Conditional on receiving the
nomination at the federal level, the probability of winning is also independent of
the choice of party. This is because each party has a moderate and an extremist
member in states where it wins and also nominates these with equal probabil-
ity for the state election. Accordingly, both parties have an equal number of
politicians of either type in their federal candidate pool in expectation. This
means that the “expected opponent” at the federal election is equally strong
no matter which party a politician joins. The only factor affecting the utility
of a politician with platform 0 that may differ between parties is the proba-
bility of being nominated at the federal level. This probability is decreasing
in the number of states elections won by the party. It follows that politicians
with platform 0 in centrist states will join the party that wins fewer elections,
a force that works towards equalizing the number of states won by each party.
Equilibrium is reached if centrist politicians in centrist states have either joined
the party that wins fewer elections or are distributed across parties such that
the number of state elections won differs by at most one between them. For
example, suppose there are 2n states, in n of which the median voter’s most
preferred policy is -1 and party L accordingly wins the state election. Then
party R must win all other states, whether they are centrist or rightist.

The observations made in the preceding paragraphs are collected in the
following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** Suppose $\mathcal{P} = \{L, R\}$ with $I_L = [-1..0]$ and $I_R = [0..1]$. Then

i) politician -1 (politician 1) joins party L (party R) in every state,

ii) politician 0 joins party L (party R) in any state $s$ such that $m_s < p^-$
    ($m_s > p^+$).

iii) in any state $s$ such that $m_s \in (p^-, p^+)$ politician 0 joins party L (party R)
    if $w^*_L < w^*_R$ ($w^*_R < w^*_L$) and may be a member of either party if $w^*_L - 1 \leq
    w^*_R \leq w^*_L + 1$.

iv) and in each state the party that politician 0 joins wins.

The equilibrium of the election subgame given in lemma 1 has an interesting
feature: Parties are more extreme in states where the distribution of voters
does not favour them. For example, members of the centre-left party are more
left-leaning on average in states where the distribution of voters is strongly
skewed towards the right. This is because centrist politicians join party $R$ in this case as this is the only party that gives them a chance of winning elections. Only politicians with a left-wing platform remain in party $L$. Translated to the context of US politics, this would imply that members of the Democratic Party are more moderate on average in a very liberal state like Massachusetts, and more extreme in a conservative state like Texas. It should be noted that this prediction does not necessarily carry over to nominated candidates, if the assumption that candidates are selected randomly is relaxed. There would be an additional selection issue when trying to test this using observations on elected politicians. Regarding the membership itself, this seems like a robust prediction of the model though.

It was explained above that each party nominates a moderate or an extremist politician with equal probability at the federal level, which is true independent of the number of states won by either party. Given the behaviour imposed on completely indifferent voters, it follows that each party wins the federal election with equal probability ex-ante. The reason for this is that both of them are able to recruit moderate politicians that are attractive to the federal median voter. In contrast, one party would gain a substantial advantage if it were able to attract all centrists. As described above, electoral concerns of politicians make this impossible. Due to the importance of this result in the context of the paper, I restate it as a proposition.

**Proposition 1.** Suppose $\mathcal{P} = \{L, R\}$ with $I_L = [-1..0]$ and $I_R = [0..1]$. Then each party wins the federal election with equal probability.

It remains to establish that there actually exists an equilibrium of the game as a whole where parties $L$ and $R$ are formed and no other parties enter. This is confirmed in the following proposition, subject to a condition on payoffs being satisfied.

**Proposition 2.** An equilibrium of the party formation game where $\mathcal{P}^* = \{L, R\}$, with $I_L = [-1..0]$ and $I_R = [0..1]$, exists if

$$\frac{1}{2s}y_f + \left(1 - \frac{1}{S}\right)y_P \geq 2y_s.$$ 

**Proof.** First, consider deviations by passive founders, may they be early or late movers. It is sufficient to show that conditional on the affiliation behaviour given in lemma 1, no politician wants to deviate to joining some entering party that admits only politicians with a particular platform. Politicians with platform -1 do not gain
by joining a party with shape \([-1]\) if they are in a state with median greater than -0.5 as they would subsequently lose the state election. In a state with median voter below -0.5, on the other hand, a majority of voters would strictly prefer the new party, which would then win the state election by assumption. In equilibrium a politician with platform -1 in such a state achieves

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left[ y_s + \frac{1}{4w^*_L} y_f + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{w^*_L} \right) \frac{1}{2} y_P \right],
\]

as each member of party \(L\) gets nominated with equal probability and there are two members in the state; each of the \(w^*_L\) state-winners of party \(L\) are nominated for the federal election with equal probability; extremists can only win the federal election if party \(R\) also nominates an extremist (which happens with probability one-half) and a tie results; and both parties win the federal election ex-ante with equal probability. If the same politician were to join the entering party her payoff is \(y_s\) as she loses the federal election with certainty. This is because there will then be three parties competing at the federal level and a politician with platform -1 can never be strictly preferred over the other two candidates by a strict majority. Accordingly, there always exists a voting equilibrium where some other party wins. As it was assumed that \(y_f > 2y_P\), the equilibrium utility decreases as \(w^*_L\) increases. As no party can win more state elections than there are states, a sufficient condition for deviations of this type not being profitable is

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left[ y_s + \frac{1}{4w^*_L} y_f + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{w^*_L} \right) \frac{1}{2} y_P \right] \geq y_s,
\]

which can be rewritten to give the condition in the statement of the proposition.

For politicians with platform 0 the equilibrium payoff is given by

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left[ y_s + \frac{3}{4w^*_j} y_f + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{w^*_j} \right) \frac{1}{2} y_P \right],
\]

with \(j \in \{L, R\}\). In case such a politician deviates to a party with shape \([0]\) she can at best hope to win the state election. This is because it was assumed that \(\Lambda_f([-0.5, 0.5]) \leq 0.5\) and there accordingly exists a voting equilibrium of the federal election where one of the other two parties wins. This is true even if all parties nominate a candidate with platform 0, as the restriction that all candidates receive an equal share of all votes when all voters are indifferent was only imposed on the equilibrium path. The payoff from the deviation is then \(y_s\), which is smaller than the equilibrium payoff. This follows because the payoff of centrist politicians is greater then the payoff of extremist politicians for a given number of state election won by the party. Accordingly, centrists do not deviate as long as extremists do not deviate.

It remains to check whether any founder has an incentive to reposition their party.
After any such deviation, there exists an equilibrium of the entry subgame reached where two late movers propose additional parties of shape \([-1..0]\) and \([0..1]\) and no politicians join any of the incumbent parties. It was already established in the first part of the proof that this behaviour of politicians is an equilibrium and that no additional parties can successfully enter. As both late movers then win at least one state election, neither of them wants to deviate to remaining passive. This ensures that any deviation by an early mover is not profitable.

I will refer to the equilibrium in the preceding proposition as the \(L-R\) equilibrium. Under this constellation of parties no third party can successfully enter for reasons easily illustrated in an example: Suppose a party were to enter that admits only politicians with platform -1 as members. Given that such a party attracts members, it may do well at the state level, but would not be able to win the federal election due to the presence of the two already established parties. Politicians with platform -1 in states with very left-leaning median voters may nevertheless be tempted to join the entering party, as this eliminates competition from centrist politicians for the party nomination at the state level. The incumbent party prevents them from defecting by offering career prospects at the federal level. These include the possibility of becoming the party’s nominee for the federal election as well as the payoff \(y_P\). In the context of many countries this payoff represents positions in the federal government or high up in the party hierarchy. In the US, parties also control assignments to posts on congressional committees. Such positions give individual legislators greater influence. This influence may then also translate into higher earnings outside of politics.

While the set of parties \(\{L, R\}\) is robust to entry in many cases, the threat of entry is nevertheless required to support the equilibrium. Either party leader would otherwise have an incentive to exclude extremist politicians from the party, winning at least as many state elections as before and increasing the probability of winning the federal election. With entry this move is not profitable: That a part of the political spectrum is not covered by any party means that entry must occur. A new party can easily recruit the politicians otherwise unable to join a party and win at least some state elections. Consequently, this new party will also nominate a candidate for the federal election. With three candidates competing at the federal level there exists a voting equilibrium where the candidate of party \(L\) loses. My interpretation of this is that entry of even an extremist party poses a serious threat because of the danger that the
I)

II)

established party loses its core support. Real-life examples of this abound: The UK Conservative Party currently fears the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), not so much because UKIP itself is expected to win many elections, but because the votes lost to UKIP may hand victory in the upcoming general election to the Labour Party. In Germany, the market-oriented reforms unexpectedly pushed through by chancellor Gerhard Schroeder between 2002 and 2003 alienated the socialist wing of his party and fostered the formation of left-wing party The Left. The Social Democrats have been trailing the Christian Democrats in federal elections ever since.

Defeat at the general election due to a split in the left-wing vote implies that party $L$ becomes less attractive and all eligible politicians prefer to join party $R$. Even entry of an extremist party would consequently deter the leader of party $L$ from deviating. There thus exists a mutual dependence: Extremist politicians prefer being members of a more moderate party due to the opportunities that come with being a member of federally powerful party. The party, on the other hand, is happy to offer these opportunities as it benefits from having extremist politicians as members rather than as competitors.

The set of all equilibria with two parties is characterized in appendix A and illustrated in figure 4. The constellation in panel I) is the $L$-$R$ equilibrium discussed previously. If career opportunities at the federal level are not sufficiently valuable to prevent extremists from joining smaller parties, this equilibrium fails to exist. There then nevertheless exists a two-party equilibrium, which is exemplified in panel II) of figure 4. Here an extremist left-wing party (right-wing party) faces a centre-right (centre-left) party. I will refer to this equilibrium as

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For simplicity, the proof uses the fact that a harsher punishment can be assigned after this deviation by the leader of party $L$. However, even entry of a party of shape $[-1]$ as it is discussed here is sufficient to make this deviation not profitable.
Figure 5: Existence of Two-Party Equilibria

Notes: Both panels show equilibrium existence in $y_f$-$y_P$ space for $y_s = 1$ and a fixed number of states. In the upper panel the number of states is equal to four. The lower panel presents the limit case as the number of states increases towards infinity.

the $M$-$E$ equilibrium. The moderate party wins the federal election with higher probability than parties in the $L$-$R$ equilibrium do, increasing the payoff of its members. This can prevent them from joining a third party, even when the $L$-$R$ equilibrium does not exist.

If even the $M$-$E$ equilibrium is not robust to members of the larger party defecting to a smaller party, no equilibrium with two parties exists. This is illustrated in figure 5 for $y_s$ equal to one. In the upper panel the number of states is equal to four, while the lower panel corresponds to the limit case as the number of states goes towards infinity. Under combinations of values for the payoffs $y_f$ and $y_P$ that fall into region I the $L$-$M$ and the $M$-$E$ equilibrium both exist, while in region II the $M$-$E$ equilibrium is the unique equilibrium with two parties. While the $M$-$E$ equilibrium exists more broadly, the $L$-$R$ equilibrium seems more empirically relevant, as it generates competitive federal elections and also allows for party switching of moderate politicians, as is observable in the US for example. Comparing both panels illustrates how internal competition
increases with the number of states. When the number of states is low, each state winner has a high chance of being nominated for the federal election. This prospect alone can be enough to keep politicians from deviating to joining smaller parties, who would offer less competition at the state level. As the number of states increases, the probability with which each individual politician wins the federal nomination of her party goes to zero. A sufficiently high value for the payoff $y_P$ is then required in order to prevent defections. In region III of the figure, no equilibrium with two parties exists. The space above the diagonal line, on the other hand, is not part of the parameter space due to the assumption $y_f > 2y_P$.

5.2 Equilibria with Any Number of Parties

This section considers the possibility of equilibria where the number of parties formed is not equal to two. A result that can easily be established is that equilibria with only one party do not exist.

Proposition 3. There is no equilibrium such that $N^* = 1$.

Proof. Suppose only one party exists and call this party $A$. As party $A$ cannot cover all platforms, there must be some policy $p$ such that politicians with this platform are not allowed to join party $A$. Then a passive founder could successfully form a party $D$ that accepts only politicians with platform $p$: By assumption, there exists a state with a median voter who strictly prefers platform $p$ over any other platform. In this state party $D$ would accordingly win the state election, as there are only two parties nominating candidates. This contradicts that only one party exists. $\square$

If there was only one party, this party would not be able to allow all politicians to join by assumption. But if some politicians are unable to join any party, a new party that allows just these politicians to join could easily recruit them. Due to the assumption on heterogeneity in voter preferences across states, this party would then also win at least one state election.

It should be stressed that the result that no single party can fend off entry would continue to hold even if parties were allowed to cover all policies. The reason is that such a party would create intense competition for nominations within the party, making at least some politicians willing to join a second party.

No such clear-cut results can be established once equilibria with three or more parties are considered, as this set is large. What is more, the equilibrium number of parties can also be large as demonstrated by the following example.
Lemma 2. Suppose there are $S$ states, with two and only two states $s$ such that $m_s \in (p^-, p^+)$. Also, let it be true for any state $s'$ such that $m_{s'} \notin (p^-, p^+)$ that $\Lambda_{s'}([-0.5, 0.5]) > 0.5$. Then there exists an equilibrium such that $N^* = S$.

Proof. Consider the following strategy profile: $S$ founders propose parties. Two of them propose a party of shape $[0]$. Call these centrist parties $C_1$ and $C_2$. All other parties either have the shape $[-1]$ or $[1]$. Call these parties leftist and rightist. The number of parties with shape $[-1]$ is equal to the number of states $s$ such that $m_s < p^-$. Collect these states in the set $S_l$. The number of parties with shape $[1]$ equals the number of states $s$ such that $m_s > p^+$. Collect these states in the set $S_r$. Each of the centrist parties wins the election in one of the two states that do not belong to the set $S_l \cup S_r$ and accordingly has a member in that state. Each leftist (rightist) party has a member in one and only one of the states belonging to $S_l$ ($S_r$) and wins the state election in that state. At the federal election the candidates of the centrist parties tie and no other parties receive any votes.

Given that each election features at least three candidates and the assumptions on voter distributions, there always exists a voting equilibrium such that the specified candidate wins. Centrist politicians do not gain from changing their party affiliation as they either continue to lose the state or federal election or simply substitute external competition for internal competition at the federal level. Similarly, extremist politicians do not benefit from switching parties either. Any additional parties would not win at the federal level due to strategic voting and all politicians who win state elections are already the sole member of their party in their state, implying that they would not increase their utility by joining a newly formed party. No founder wants to deviate to remaining passive, as each founder wins one state election. Finally, no founder wants to change the shape of their party, as any such deviation can be punished by entry of an additional party of the same shape that the party of the deviating founder had prior to the deviation. By virtue of the preceding steps of the proof, there then exists an equilibrium of the election subgame reached where the party of the deviating founder does not gain any members. $\square$

The proof of the preceding proposition illustrates the possibility that a large number of parties forms, only a few of which play a role at the federal level. What may be the reason that such an equilibrium is not typically observed in reality? One possibility is that constellations with many parties do not persist because there are incentives for parties to merge. In fact, mergers are commonly observed in reality. To name just a few examples: The Liberal Democrats of the UK were formed as a fusion of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party. The Conservative Party of Canada came into existence as a merger of
the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance. In Australia, the coalition between the Liberal Party and the National Party has existed for so long that it is often treated as a single party.

One gain from a merger may be that an alliance of parties wins more elections than a number of small parties taken together would. A second potential reason for a merger of parties lies in synergies such as reduced administrative costs, more effective fund-raising and advertising campaigns, and greater recognition by voters in states where the party does not have a strong presence. In the model, such an incentive for a merger comes from the presence of the fixed cost $c$ that founders pay when forming a party. Avoiding this cost can make a merger profitable even if the newly formed party does not enjoy greater success.

Note that any merger that happens for reasons of increased electoral success also leads to a reduction in fixed costs, while the converse is not true. In trying to integrate mergers into the model I will therefore focus on fixed costs as the driving force, which is also simpler to implement than the case where electoral motivations play a role. Doing so requires that leaders are somehow able to share the benefits of their joint ventures. I allow for this by giving founders the ability of committing to transfers to other founders in the beginning of the game that are conditional on whether or not the founder receiving the transfer proposes a party. In reality these transfers will often take the form of powerful positions in the party hierarchy or in government, which are pledged to party leaders who agree to enter into an alliance. The ability to credibly commit to these transfers, on the other hand, can be justified by reputational concerns. Formally, such a promise takes the shape of a map $\{0, 1\} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_+$, which assigns an amount of utility to be transferred to a founder to an indicator for whether this founder has proposed a party or not. Accordingly, the strategy space of each founder is extended to allow for a choice of a vector of infinite length consisting of such maps. Let $\bar{\ell}$ be the sum of all transfers a founder receives net of any transfers the founder carries out. The utility of this founder is then given by

$$\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi_s x_w + \pi_f x_f - c + \bar{\ell},$$

using the same notation as in section 4. Call this version of the game the extended party-formation game.

Beyond transfers, mergers also require the possibility of joint deviations by groups of founders. One way to allow for this would be to look for equilibria
that are coalition-proof as defined by Bernheim et al. (1987). However, a much simpler approach, which turns out to be equivalent in this particular case, is to look for equilibria that are Pareto efficient among founders in the extended party-formation game. I say that such an equilibrium is robust to party mergers.

As is shown in the appendix B, transfers cannot be used to maintain formations of parties that are not stable in the original game. This would require sufficiently large transfers to all passive founders in order to prevent them from taking the opportunity of forming a successful party. In reality, one would expect it to be impossible to pay off all individuals in a position to initiate the formation of a party. The same is true here due to the assumption that the number of founders is infinite. The result would also hold for a finite but sufficiently larger number of founders.

Furthermore, it is necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium to be robust to party mergers that there exists no other equilibrium with a lower number of parties (Lemma 4 in appendix B). Only an equilibrium with a lower number of parties generates a greater sum of utilities among founders, which can then be redistributed through transfers such that a Pareto improvement results. The reason that the sum of utilities is greater when there are fewer parties is due to the fixed cost \( c \) that any party leader has to pay.

Combined these results make it possible to fully characterize the number of parties formed in party-formation equilibria that are robust to party mergers.

**Proposition 4.** The number of parties in any party-formation equilibrium that is robust to party mergers is

1) no lower than two and no greater than three,

2) equal to two whenever a party-formation equilibrium exists in which two parties are formed.

*Proof.* See appendix B.

A second look at figure 5 illustrates the set of equilibria that are robust to party mergers. In regions I and II, two-party equilibria exist and all other types of equilibria are therefore ruled out. In region III the only equilibria that are robust to party mergers feature three parties. The equilibrium used to establish this result is one where all existing parties allow only one type of politician to join, there is one such party for each possible platform, and the candidates of the two extremist parties tie at the federal election. Other three-party equilibria exist as well. An interesting possibility are equilibria which are “almost
identical” to one of the two-party equilibria. As an example, consider the $M$-$E$ equilibrium with $I_M = [-1..0]$ and $I_E = [1]$. A comparison of the upper and the lower panel of figure 5 shows that this equilibrium sometimes exists only if the number of states is sufficiently low. Otherwise too much internal competition makes extremist members of party $M$ willing to defect to a newly formed party of shape $[-1]$. This suggests the existence of an equilibrium where this smaller party forms in addition to the parties of the $M$-$E$ equilibrium and voters at the federal level behave as if the smaller party did not exist (this is possible under strategic voting). While not successful at the federal level, the additional party wins some state elections and thereby reduces internal competition among members of party $M$ sufficiently to prevent further deviations.

The model thus allows for the formation of parties that win state elections and play no role federally, but only if the expected value of career opportunities at the federal level is sufficiently low. Thinking more broadly, the model suggests an additional reason for the existence of parties whose success is confined to specific regions. Take the Scottish National Party (SNP) as an example. A politician who firmly believes that Scotland should be an independent country cannot expect to have a career at the national level of the UK. Naturally, such politicians will then try to establish a party of their own, explaining the existence of the SNP. The same reasoning applies to other regions with separatist movements, such as Catalonia in Spain, Quebec in Canada, or South Tyrol in Italy.

6 Robustness

The basic model of party formation presented here requires a number of simplifying assumptions for tractability. This section will discuss some of these in more detail.

6.1 Comprehensive Parties

Parties that allow all politicians to join were ruled out in the basic version of the model. This section will discuss what additional equilibria exist if parties of shape $[-1..1]$ were included in the action space of founders. As was already argued above, even a party that allows all politicians to join would not be able to deter entry of additional parties due to intense internal competition. However, focusing on the class of two-party equilibria, two additional stable
constellations of parties emerge. One features either the equilibrium set of parties $\{[-1..1], [-1..0]\}$ or $\{[-1..1], [0..1]\}$. This constellation can actually be essentially equivalent to the $M$-$E$ equilibrium. This is the case when all eligible politicians join the smaller party in all states. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs of voters then prevent any deviations by politicians towards joining the larger party.

The second case is that an equilibrium with two parties of shape $[-1..1]$. This is possible because out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be used to make both parties have only one member in any state, as in the previous paragraph. It seems unlikely though that a party could maintain such widely varying ideological profiles across different states. If both parties had three members in most states, on the other hand, entry of a party of shape $[0]$ would be possible. This is because the larger parties then create too much internal competition. Furthermore, a centrist party could also do well federally, as it is relatively likely that both of the larger parties nominate a candidate with platform -1 or that both of them nominate a candidate with platform 1. In both cases a strict majority of voters would prefer a centrist candidate, who would accordingly win by assumption.

A way of eliminating the equilibria just discussed would be to allow politicians within a state to make joint-deviations. This would make it impossible that a party of shape $[-1..1]$ wins a state election with a single member in that state, as the remaining two politicians would be better off by coordinating on joining the winning party. By the same logic as in the preceding paragraph, entry of a party of shape $[0]$ would then occur. Other equilibria discussed above, on the other hand, are robust to allowing for such joint deviations. On the equilibrium path, the constellations of parties considered actually give no scope for joint deviations, as at most one politician has a choice between different parties. Off the equilibrium path, there is no point in making joint deviations. The reason why politicians may find a deviation to an additional party attractive is that this can reduce the degree of internal competition they face at the state level. A joint-deviation would eliminate this benefit.

6.2 A Greater Number Of Politicians

Allowing for a greater number of politicians is difficult, as this leads to a greater number of cases to consider. It also increases the scope for coordination failure at the stage at which party affiliations are chosen and thus the number of equilibria. Nevertheless, one effect of a higher number of politicians populating each state
is clear: More politicians imply greater internal competition for nominations at the state level. This would make existence of the two-party equilibria discussed above less likely, as the magnitude of the payoffs $y_s$ and $y_P$ required in order to keep politicians from joining smaller parties increases proportionally with the number of party members. This may not be too much of a concern: The politicians in the model should be thought of as those who have already achieved some prominence within state parties and are therefore in a position to be considered for nominations. At any given point in time the number of such individuals will be limited. In addition, an emerging party focused on issues already covered by an existing party would find it hard to achieve credibility if it fails to attract any of the more prominent members of that party. In fact, the formation of new parties is typically the product of a whole faction of an existing party defecting jointly. It is possible to interpret each politician in the model as representing factions who coordinate their actions.

6.3 Policy Choices

The assumption that politicians are committed to implementing their platform is not satisfying. While the empirical literature presented in section 3 seems to suggest that policy preferences of politicians are the main driver of their choices in office, it would be more appealing to see this behaviour emerge as part of an equilibrium rather than imposing it from the outset. In the model, extremist politicians can often increase their chances of winning the federal election by pretending to be a centrist when choosing state policies. To address this concern I will consider a more general utility function for politicians that includes both career concerns and policy preferences. For a politician with ideal policy $i$ let the utility function now be given by

$$\pi_s(y_s + \pi_n \pi_f y_f + (1 - \pi_n) \pi_P y_P) - \alpha \sum_{l \in \{s,f\}} (p_l - i)^2,$$

using the same notation as in section 4. In addition, assume that politicians can freely choose the policy they implement at any stage. All other elements of the game remain unchanged. This more general version of the model is challenging to solve in its entirety. I will present results for the election subgame reached after parties $L$ and $R$ have been proposed.

Proceeding by backwards induction, it is clear that any politician elected at the federal level will implement her ideal policy. All other stages are less
straightforward. I will start by asking under what conditions a separating equilibrium exists where politicians implement their ideal policy at the state level and otherwise behave as in lemma 1. In this case a politician with ideal policy -1 achieves a continuation utility of

$$\frac{1}{w_L^*} \left[ \frac{1}{4} y_f + \frac{1}{4} (-\alpha 4) + \frac{1}{2} (-\alpha) \right] + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{w_L^*} \right) U_n$$

after winning a state election, where the term $U_n$ captures the utility in case the politician is not nominated for the federal election. Choosing the policy 0 after the state election results in a utility of

$$-\alpha + \frac{1}{w_L^*} \left[ \frac{3}{4} y_f + \frac{1}{4} (-\alpha) \right] + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{w_L^*} \right) U_n .$$

The politician now incurs a cost for a suboptimal policy choice but increases her chance of winning the federal election, simultaneously reducing the probability that an extremist from party $R$ gets elected. Note that voters do not observe that a deviation has taken place as the politician elected in the state has ideal policy 0 with positive probability ex-ante. It can then be shown that the separating equilibrium exists as long as the ratio $\alpha/y_f$ is no smaller than $\max_{j \in \{L, R\}} \frac{2}{4w_j^* - 5}$.\(^{11}\) The greater the number of elections won by a party, the lower the probability that any given politician will get nominated for the federal election, which in turn makes extremist politicians less likely to benefit from pretending to be a centrist.

Proceeding as above it can be shown that if the ratio $\alpha/y_f$ is smaller than $\min_{j \in \{L, R\}} \frac{2}{4w_j^* - 5}$ then there only exists a pooling equilibrium where all politicians implement the policy 0 at the state level.\(^{12}\) Behaviour nevertheless remains very close to the one given in lemma 1. Dropping the assumptions that voters vote myopically (which was introduced above purely as a simplification), voters in state elections will base their choice on considerations regarding federal policies as all politicians implement the same policy at the state level. Federal policies are determined by the winner of the federal election, who is effectively picked at random from among state winners. State voters thus benefit from adding politicians to this pool that have similar preferences to them.\(^ {13}\) For

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\(^{11}\)This condition applies as long as each party wins at least two state elections, which implies that $4w_j^* - 5$ is positive.

\(^{12}\)Cases where politicians in one party separate and politicians in the other party pool are more complicated and will not be considered here.

\(^{13}\)Voters at the federal election are split at zero between both parties as they cannot dis-
example, a voter with ideal policy -1 in a state where politician 0 has joined party $L$ would not vote for party $R$ as a victory by party $R$ increases the probability that a politician with platform 1 wins the federal election. As long as politicians in both parties pool, the only difference between them is the degree of internal competition for the federal nomination, at least from the perspective of a centrist politician in a centrist state. As before, these politicians will therefore tend to sort into the party that wins fewer state elections.

The empirical evidence is in favour of the separating equilibrium, where all politicians implement their own ideal policies. Nevertheless, the discussion above suggests that the overall results do not necessarily change much even if extremist politicians try to pass off as centrists.

6.4 Candidate Selection

Parties are assumed to nominate candidates randomly in the basic version of the model. This hurts the chances of either party of winning the federal election. However, if parties were to nominate a centrist politician for the federal election whenever one is available, this would reduce the expected utility of extremist party members and potentially induce them to join a third party. In order to prevent this, the party leader may have an incentive to commit ex-ante to nominating extremists with a sufficiently high probability. In practice this could be achieved through choosing a particular mechanism for candidate selection, such as primaries or nomination through voting by delegates at the party convention. As it turns out, the requirement to keep extremist party members satisfied may lead to extremists being nominated with even greater probability than in the basic model. This possibility is demonstrated in appendix C, which analyses an extension of the model where the party leader commits to a probability of nominating either type of politician at the federal election.

A second and closely related possibility of keeping the extremist wing of the party satisfied would be to increase the probability with which extremist politicians get nominated in extremist states. To some extent I feel that the assumption that the nomination process is fairly noisy from the perspective of party-outsiders is more appropriate at the state level than at the federal level. After all, state-level candidates are often little known to the public and different factions within the party will be pulling in different directions, with the party distinguish between candidates exactly, but know that the candidate of either party may be a centrist or an extremist with equal probability.
leader (the party establishment) certainly favouring moderate candidates due to their electability at the federal election. Nevertheless, nominating candidates through primary elections may be one way to ensure that candidates fit the preferences of the state median voter well. If this is the case, then it becomes even easier to see how national parties maintain regional monopolies: Extremist politicians in extremist states would basically face no internal competition from moderates and the existence conditions for the two-party equilibrium of proposition 2 would be greatly relaxed. It is noteworthy though that even in this case no single party would be able to monopolize all elections. Intense internal competition for the federal nomination would still lead to the successful entry of a second party and proposition 3 continuous to hold.

7 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to provide an explanation for why federal elections are typically strongly competitive, while state elections are often dominated by one party. This pattern is a product of the interaction between political demand (voter preferences) and supply (political parties). The model presented here has focused on political parties while taking heterogeneity in voter preferences as given. It was shown that an equilibrium with two parties, one centre-left and one centre-right, can explain the main features of the data. In this equilibrium, states with centrist median voters will display small vote margins while state elections with more extreme median voters are dominated by one party. Such regional monopolies are possible for two reasons: First of all, parties cannot promise to implement policies other then the ones preferred by its members. This makes it impossible for, say, a left-wing party to appeal to right-wing voters. Secondly, and relatedly, a third party would have to attract some of the members of an existing parties in order to successfully contest a regional monopoly. The existing party, however, prevents its members from defecting by offering its members career opportunities (inside the party and at the federal level) that they would not have as members of a smaller regional party.

The federal level, on the other hand, turns out to be competitive as both parties are able to attract a symmetric candidate pool. If, in contrast, all moderate politicians were to sort into one party, this would skew the electoral odds in favour of that party. This is impossible. For example, if all centrists were to join the centre-right party, there would be some states with a very
left-leaning electorate where the left-wing party nevertheless wins elections. In such states moderate politicians simply have to join the centre-left party if they want to win elections. An extremist state thus becomes a source of centrist candidates for the party that can win elections there.

It is, however, not necessarily by choice that each party maintains an ideological profile that makes it particularly attractive towards voters in some states. Moderating the party could potentially increase success at the federal level while also raising the number of votes received in some centrist states. If both parties did so, there would be no clear difference between them and no reason why one of them should do much better than the other in any state election. The force that prevents this outcome is the threat of entry of more extreme parties. It was shown that a single state with a voter located relatively far to the left and a single state with median voter located relatively far to the right is sufficient to make this threat of entry effective. The prospect of winning a single state election is enough for a third party to form, which would then also be able to participate in the federal election. The established parties do not shift towards the political centre due to the risk that the third party that would subsequently enter could attract enough votes to make the deviating party lose the federal election.

The data presented in this paper was taken from a sample of federal states and the model was also framed in this context. I believe that the mechanisms discussed here should nevertheless be useful for thinking about other types of institutional arrangements as well. For example, consider a politician who is planning to contest a seat in the House of Commons in the UK. If this person stands politically between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, it seems likely that she will base her choice of affiliation on which party is more popular in her district. Having such moderate members will affect how either party is perceived by voters and accordingly also influence election results. Furthermore, all democratic countries hold regional elections. Winning these can serve to raise the profile of a newly formed party, even if this election does not receive quite as much attention as one for a state parliament would. The threat of entry would then operate in a similar way as it was described above.

A more serious shortcoming is that the analysis has focused on plurality rule, while other electoral systems were given no consideration. In particular, it would be interesting to know how well the results extend to proportional representation, where the number of parties achieving a significant share of votes is typically larger. Due to the already complicated nature of the model it
would have been a challenge to incorporate the additional complexity inherent in a system of proportional representation. I hope to address this question in future work.
Appendix

A Additional Results for the Basic Model

This appendix provides a full characterization of equilibria with two parties beyond the L-R equilibrium analysed in the main text and demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium with three parties.

Proposition 5. An equilibrium of the party-formation game where $\mathcal{P}^* = \{M, E\}$ with either $I_M = [-1,0]$ and $I_E = [1]$, or $I_M = [0,1]$ and $I_E = [-1]$ exists whenever

$$\frac{1}{N} y_f + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \frac{3}{4} y_P \geq 2 y_s .$$

Proof. As the equilibria in the statement of the proposition are symmetric to each other, the proof will focus on the case $I_M = [-1,0]$ and $I_E = [1]$. In this case the affiliation behaviour of politicians is trivial. Party $M$ wins all states $s$ such that $m_s < p^+$ and wins the federal election with probability three-fourth. It will first be shown that entry of additional parties is impossible.

The equilibrium utility of extremist members of party $M$ is

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[y_s + \frac{1}{2w_M} y_{f} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{w_M}\right) \frac{3}{4} y_P \right] .$$

This expression is decreasing in $w_M$ under the assumption that $y_f > 2 y_P$. If this politician joins an entering party of shape $[-1]$, she may win the state election, but can be made the certain loser of the federal election. As party $M$ cannot win more state election than there are states, it follows that a sufficient condition for this deviation not being profitable is

$$\frac{1}{N} y_f + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \frac{3}{4} y_P \geq 2 y_s .$$

Centrist politicians achieve a higher utility in equilibrium than extremist members of party $M$ as they win the federal election with higher probability. Due to the assumption that $\Lambda_f([-0.5,0.5]) \leq 0.5$ and the presence of three candidates at the federal level, there exists a voting equilibrium such that centrist candidates of a third party do not win at the federal level. Their deviation payoff is accordingly also $y_s$. This shows that centrist members of party $M$ do not deviate to joining a third party whenever politicians with platform -1 refrain from doing so.

Finally, members of party $E$ do not gain from joining a party of shape $[1]$ as they at best win all elections with the same probability as before.
It remains to be checked whether any active founders want to deviate. Any such deviation can be punished by entry of an additional party of the same shape that the party of the deviating founder had prior to the deviation. By virtue of the proceeding steps of the proof, there then exists an equilibrium of the election subgame reached where the party of the deviating founder does not gain any members. □

The equilibrium in the preceding proposition will be referred to as the \textit{M-E} equilibrium.

Any other constellation of two parties not considered so far is never part of an equilibrium.

\textbf{Proposition 6.} \textit{No constellation of two parties other than }\{[-1..0],[0..1]\}, \{[-1..0],[1]\}, \textit{and }\{[-1],[0..1]\} \textit{is part of an equilibrium.}

\textit{Proof.} It is straightforward to verify that under any constellation of two parties not listed in the statement of the proposition there must be some platform \(p\) such that politicians with this platform cannot join any party. Suppose a party of shape \(p\) enters. Due to the assumptions on voter distributions there exists at least one state where a strict majority of voters strictly prefers the platform \(p\) over the expected platform of a candidate of any other party. It then follows from the restrictions on voting behaviour that the newly formed party wins at least one state election. □

Finally, it can be shown that an equilibrium with three parties exists whenever no equilibrium with two parties does.

\textbf{Proposition 7.} \textit{An equilibrium such that }\mathcal{P}^* = \{A,B,C\} \textit{ with }\mathcal{I}_A = [-1], \mathcal{I}_B = [0], \textit{and }\mathcal{I}_C = [1]\textit{ exists whenever no equilibrium with two parties exists.}

\textit{Proof.} Suppose the set of parties \{A,B,C\} is formed in equilibrium with \(\mathcal{I}_A = [-1]\), \(\mathcal{I}_B = [0]\), and \(\mathcal{I}_C = [1]\). Then the affiliation behaviour of politicians is trivial. Assume the candidates of parties \(A\) and \(C\) tie at the national level, party \(B\) wins all centrist states and states \(s\) such that \(\Lambda_s([-0.5,0.5]) > 0.5\), and party \(A\) (party \(C\)) wins all state elections in states \(s\) such that \(m_s < p^-\) \((m_s > p^+)\) and \(\Lambda_s([-0.5,0.5]) \leq 0.5\).

Passive founders are unable to enter with a new party. There would be at least three parties competing at the federal level, implying that there exists a voting equilibrium such that the newly formed party loses. Politicians therefore have no incentive to join this new party, as they either already win the election in their state with certainty or would not win even after the deviation.

It remains to check whether any founder has an incentive to reposition their party. Any such deviation can be punished by entry of an additional party of the same shape that the party of the deviating founder had prior to the deviation. By virtue of the proceeding steps of the proof, there then exists an equilibrium of the election subgame reached where the party of the deviating founder does not gain any members. □
B Robustness To Party Mergers

This appendix derives some properties of equilibria of the extended party formation game that are robust to party mergers, as defined in section 5.2. The first result regarding the extended party-formation game says that transfers cannot be used to maintain formations of parties that are not stable in the original game.

Lemma 3. Any constellation of parties $P^*$ that is part of a party-formation equilibrium of the extended game must have the feature that for any additional party $D$ there exists an equilibrium of the election subgame under the set of parties $P^* \cup \{D\}$ such that party $D$ does not win any state elections.

Proof. Suppose there was an equilibrium of the extended game such that the condition in the statement of the lemma was not satisfied. This implies that without transfers some passive founders would have an incentive to propose additional parties. That this constellation is nevertheless an equilibrium of the extended game would require that any passive founder receives a net transfer at least as large as the utility she could achieve by forming a party. This utility would be at least as great as $x_w - c > 0$. The total sum of transfers from party leaders to passive founders must therefore be infinite, while the total utility of all party leaders is no larger than $Sx_w + x_f$ and therefore finite. Consequently, at least one party leader would be achieving negative utility and prefer to remain passive.

The second result shows that the requirement of robustness to party mergers selects those party-formation equilibria with the lowest number of parties, but does not discriminate between equilibria within that class.

Lemma 4. A party-formation equilibrium is robust to party mergers if and only if there exists no other equilibrium in which a smaller number of parties is formed.

Proof. Assume there is a party-formation equilibrium $E$ such that $N^* = k$ and there is a potentially empty set $\mathcal{F}_T$ of founders who receive transfers from other founders. Let $\mathcal{F}_E$ be the set of founders who propose parties in this equilibrium. All founders who make transfers must belong to the set $\mathcal{F}_E$. Any founder not belonging to this set could lower the transfers she makes to zero. This would not affect the transfers she receives as these can depend only on whether or not a founder proposes a party. The total utility of all members of the set $\mathcal{F}_E \cup \mathcal{F}_T$ is therefore equal to $Sx_w + x_f - kc$.

To show necessity, suppose that there exists a second party-formation equilibrium $E'$ in which a number of parties $k' < k$ is formed. Now consider the following equilibrium: In the first step, $k'$ members of the set $\mathcal{F}_E$ promise transfers such that any founder belonging to $\mathcal{F}_E \cup \mathcal{F}_T$ achieves a strictly greater utility than in the equilibrium $E$. This is possible because the total utility of all founders is higher in the equilibrium.
than in the equilibrium \( E \) by the amount \((k - k')c\). The same \( k' \) founders subsequently propose the set of parties that exists along the equilibrium path of \( E' \). If any deviation occurs at the first stage, the same set of parties as in the equilibrium \( E \) is formed. This ensures that no founder can gain from such deviations. Deviations by passive founders to proposing a party are not profitable as the set of parties proposed in any subgame deters entry by lemma 3. This shows that the equilibrium \( E \) is not robust to party mergers.

For sufficiency, note that any equilibrium \( E' \) in which the number of parties is equal to or greater than \( k \) generates a total utility that is no greater than the total utility achieved in the equilibrium \( E \). It follows immediately that it is impossible that the equilibrium \( E' \) Pareto dominates the equilibrium \( E \).

It is then possible to fully characterize the number of parties formed in party-formation equilibria that are robust to party mergers.

**Proposition 8.** The number of parties in any party-formation equilibrium that is robust to party mergers is

i) no lower than two and no greater than three,

ii) equal to two whenever a party-formation equilibrium exists in which two parties are formed.

**Proof.** Whenever only a single party exists, passive founders must have an incentive to form additional parties by proposition 3. Lemma 3 then implies that there must be at least two parties in any party-formation equilibrium that is robust to party mergers. Combined with lemma 4 this establishes claim ii). In order to show that there cannot be more than three parties it needs to be demonstrated that there exists a party-formation equilibrium of the extended game in which three parties are formed whenever no equilibrium with two parties exists. This result has been established in proposition 7 in appendix A.

\[\square\]

### C Candidate Selection

Consider a version of the basic model described in section 4, where the founder of a party \( P \) makes an additional strategic choice in committing to a probability \( q_P \).

In any situation where party \( P \) has both extremist and moderate politicians in its candidate pool for the federal election, the candidate for this election will be randomly drawn from among centrists with probability \( q_P \) and from among extremists with probability \( 1 - q_P \). The choice of \( q_P \) is made simultaneous to the proposal of the party. This appendix will provide a proof for the claim made in section 6.4 that this extended version of the model may have an equilibrium where extremist politicians are nominated with probability greater than one-half. To do so I will derive an equilibrium
of this more general model where parties $L$ and $R$ as defined in the main text get proposed, no other parties can successfully enter, and $q_L = q_R = q$ for some probability $q$. Throughout this section it will be assumed that there are four states, one with a leftist median voter, one with a rightist median voter, and two with centrist median voters. It will also be assumed that $y_f > \frac{29}{32} y_P$.

Start by considering the affiliation behaviour of politicians. Let $\pi_f(q|p)$ be the probability that a candidate for the federal election with platform $p$ wins, given that the other party uses the nomination probability $q$. In the case where party $L$ wins the state election in one other state, the utility of a member of party $L$ with platform -1 in a state where $L$ wins is

$$\frac{1}{2} \left\{ y_s + \left[ \frac{1}{2} (1 - q) + \frac{1}{4} \right] \pi_f(q|-1)y_f + \left[ \frac{1}{2} q \pi_f(q|0) + \frac{1}{4} \pi_f(q|-1) \right] y_P \right\},$$

with $\pi_f(q|-1) = \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{2} (1 - q)$ and $\pi_f(q|0) = \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4} q$. For $q = 0$ this expression becomes

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( y_s + \frac{9}{32} y_f + \frac{3}{32} y_P \right).$$

In the state with median voter at or below -0.5 such a candidate can achieve a utility of at most $y_s$ by deviating to joining a new party. The deviation utility is no greater than the equilibrium utility for $q = 0$ as

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( y_s + \frac{9}{32} y_f + \frac{3}{32} y_P \right) > \frac{1}{2} \left( y_s + \frac{29}{32} y_f + \frac{3}{32} y_P \right) = \frac{1}{2} (y_s + y_P),$$

where the first inequality holds due to the assumption that $y_f > \frac{29}{32} y_P$. Deviating to joining a new party is consequently worse as long as $y_P \geq y_s$. It follows from the continuity of payoffs in $q$ that politicians with platform -1 or 1 either do not want to deviate even if $q = 1$ or that there exists some threshold $q^e \in (0, 1)$ such that the deviation is not undertaken for $q = q^e$, but occurs for any $q > q^e$. In the former case set $q^e = 1$.

Politicians with platform 0 in states with centrist median voters have a choice between joining the same or separate parties. In the latter case each achieves a utility of

$$\frac{1}{2} \left\{ y_s + \left( \frac{1}{2} q + \frac{1}{4} \right) \pi_f(q|0)y_f + \left[ \frac{1}{2} (1 - q) \pi_f(q|-1) + \frac{1}{4} \pi_f(q|0) \right] y_P \right\}, \quad (1)$$

with $\pi_f(q|-1)$ and $\pi_f(q|0)$ as given above. For $q = 0$ this simplifies to

$$\frac{1}{2} \left( y_s + \frac{7}{32} y_f + \frac{13}{32} y_P \right).$$

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If both politicians join the same party their utility becomes

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left[ y_s + \left( \frac{1}{12} + \frac{1}{2}q + \frac{1}{4}q \right) \frac{3}{4} y_f + \left( \frac{1}{8} + \frac{3}{16} q + \frac{3}{16} (1-q) \right) y_F \right].
\]

(2)

Setting \(q\) to zero yields

\[
\frac{1}{2} \left( y_s + \frac{1}{16} y_f + \frac{5}{16} y_F \right).
\]

Both politicians thus prefer being in separate parties for \(q = 0\). It follows from the continuity of payoffs in \(q\) that politicians with platform 0 in centrist states either both want to be members of the same party even if \(q = 1\) or that there exists some threshold \(q^c \in (0,1)\) such that they are indifferent at \(q = q^c\), but would prefer being members of the same party for any \(q > q^c\). In the former case set \(q^c = 1\).

It can be shown that \(q^c > 0.5\). To do so evaluate expressions (1) and (2) at \(q = 0.5\). This yields \(\frac{1}{2}(y_s + \frac{3}{8} y_f + \frac{1}{2} y_P)\) and \(\frac{1}{2}(y_s + \frac{1}{4} y_f + \frac{5}{16} y_P)\), respectively. The first utility is greater than the second utility as long as \(y_f > y_P\). This shows that centrist politicians in centrist states prefer to be members of the same party for \(q = 0\) and \(q = 0.5\). It is easy to show that expression (1) is concave in \(q\) as long as \(y_f > y_P\), while expression (2) is linear in \(q\). It immediately follows that the former utility must be greater then the latter utility for any \(q \in [0,0.5]\). This demonstrates that the threshold \(q^c\) must be greater than 0.5.

Now assume \(y_s = y_P = 1\) and \(y_f = 5\). In this case it can be calculated that \(q^c \approx 0.38\). This is below the threshold \(q^c\), which must be greater than 0.5. Is there an equilibrium such that \(P^* = \{L,R\}\) and the founder of each party sets \(q\) equal to \(q^c\) ? As long as the affiliation behaviour of politicians does not change, the utility of a founder is increasing in his choice of \(q\), as centrist politicians win the federal election with higher probability. Accordingly, neither founder would want to deviate to choosing a lower value of \(q\) than the equilibrium one. Increasing the level of \(q\) beyond \(q^c\) would lead to the entry of a new party, as extremist politicians in the party under consideration would then be willing to deviate by the definition of the cut-off \(q^e\). As in the proof of proposition 3, the entry of such a party reduces the utility of the party leader undertaking the deviation to zero. As \(q^e < q^c\), centrist politicians will join different parties. A straightforward calculation based on the expressions derived above shows that their utility is greater than \(y_s\), which is the utility they could achieve by joining a third party.
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