Program > Papers by speaker > Gonzalez Stéphane

Monday 12
B9 - Miscellaneous I
Chair: Benoît Tarroux
› 13:40 - 14:05 (25min)
› Room 104 - B. Bartok
The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core
Stéphane Gonzalez  1@  , Alain Marciano  2@  , Philippe Solal  3@  
1 : Gonzalez  (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne)  -  Website
GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
2 : Laboratoire Montpelierien d'Economie théorique et appliquée  (LAMETA)  -  Website
3 : GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne  (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne)  -  Website
GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne

The “Coase theorem” is made of the efficiency and the neutrality theses. Using cooperative
game theory, we show that these two theses are not compatible: there exist only two types
of rights assignments that guarantee a nonempty core. Thus, the efficiency thesis holds –
there exist (two types of) rights assignments under which the core of the game is nonempty
– but the neutrality thesis does not hold – for all other rights assignments the core is empty.
This complements the results found in the literature on Coase and the core. Our paper
also adds two more results. Indeed, we add two principles that are not discussed in the
literature about the Coase theorem: a democratic principle for rights assignments and
a fairness principle for the monetary payoffs distributed to the agents, that we translate
into two natural properties for a solution. We show, and this is our second main result,
that the nonempty core requirement is not compatible with our democratic and fairness
properties. Thus, under democratic and fairness criteria, the efficiency thesis does not

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