Program > Papers by author > Santoro Alessandro

Monday 12
B4 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents I
Chair: Besart Avdiu
› 14:30 - 14:55 (25min)
› Room 005 - E. Jaques-Dalcroze
The deterrence effect of real-world operational tax audits
Laura Pagani  1@  , Gabriele Mazzolini  2@  , Alessandro Santoro  2@  
1 : University of Milano Bicocca  (Unimib)  -  Website
Piazza Ateneo Nuovo, 1 20126 Milano -  Italy
2 : University of Milano Bicocca  (Unimib)

We use a large administrative tax-returns panel dataset merged with a tax audit database to estimate the effect of real-world operational tax audits on subsequent tax behavior. Our identification strategy and the institutional setting that we consider enable us to address potential endogeneity related to non-random selection of taxpayers to be audited. We find a positive and lasting effect of audits on subsequent reported income. However, in line with theoretical predictions, taxpayers do not increase tax compliance when the tax authority does not assess a positive additional income. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and samples.

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